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A Prolegomenon to Future Capital 
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ince the early 1980s, bank supervisors have made
significant strides with regard to capital require-
ments. The last fundamental change in the
United States followed the 1988 Basle Accord,
which contained explicit requirements for off-balance-
sheet positions as well as more conventional standards
based on the balance sheet.
At present, supervisors are contemplating further
steps in the refinement of capital requirements. They are
considering, among other issues, explicit requirements for
market risk, including the use of banks’ own risk manage-
ment models for capital requirement purposes, as well as
possible longer run strategies for handling risks other than
credit quality and price.1
If we assume that the current market risk proposal
is successfully implemented, where do we turn next? More
generally, what are the long-range goals of capital supervi-
sion? This article is intended as a preliminary step—a pro-
legomenon—in addressing these long-term issues.2 The
object of the article is to persuade those who think that
S
capital requirements are worth studying that it is impor-
tant to pause a moment and, abstracting from all that has
been done, to delineate a set of fundamental principles for
future work on capital requirements.
It seems important, at least from time to time, to
expand the focus of the analysis of bank capital. If only nar-
row technical questions were ever posed, it would be diffi-
cult to address the broader issues with a satisfactory level of
confidence in the results. Thus, the methodology of this
article is somewhat unusual in the context of standard eco-
nomics. The approach is empirical and deductive, but is
not based explicitly on hypothetical microeconomic mod-
eling, which is readily available elsewhere.3 Instead, this
article identifies the useful features of capital requirements,
past and present, as a means of establishing criteria that we
would find desirable in subsequent capital regimes.
As a helpful preliminary, we first draw a distinc-
tion between regulatory capital requirements (minimum
capital) and the internal risk management and capital allo-
cation of the firms (optimum capital). Although the two2F R B N Y  E CONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995
areas overlap in methodology and terminology, they differ
greatly as to their goals. Failure to recognize this distinc-
tion can lead to unnecessary confusion and has the poten-
tial to make capital requirements less useful and
institutions’ risk management less effective.
This article does not address specific capital pro-
posals nor does it suggest specific new requirements. The
framework it provides, however, has implications for possi-
ble future refinements in the supervisory approach to capi-
tal requirements.
MINIMUM CAPITAL
This section defines the concept and the goals of regula-
tory capital requirements through inherently empirical
means. It proposes to identify from past and present capi-
tal rules the specific characteristics that have made those
rules useful to their intended audiences. These characteris-
tics may then be construed as goals for future minimum
requirements.
In very broad terms, capital requirements consist
of three basic components: a definition of capital, a mea-
sure of the exposure to risk that capital is intended to cover,
and a required relationship between those two amounts
(typically a minimum ratio). Consider the components in
slightly greater detail.
Regulatory capital is defined to include those
claims on the value of the firm that are first in line to
absorb future losses arising from a broad range of contin-
gencies. Such contingencies correspond generally to the
notions of credit risk, price risk, model risk, operational
risk, liquidity risk, legal risk, and so forth. Typical exam-
ples of capital instruments are equity—the best form of
capital—and subordinated debt—which requires an event
of default for losses to be absorbed. The primary purpose of
these layers of capital is to protect the senior creditors of
the firm, especially the depositors in the case of banks.
Exposure to risk, the second component of capital
requirements, is the main focus of the current regulatory
discussion. Until the late 1980s, exposure was measured
for capital purposes by the size of a bank’s balance sheet.
In a prototypical traditional bank that issues short-term
deposits and invests in long-term commercial loans, total
assets may be a fine indicator of the institution’s risk
exposure. Such a portfolio would of course be subject to
large potential changes in its liquidation value as a result
of changing interest rates. Nonetheless, with historical
accounting and smoothing of earnings over time, the
major source of risk could be viewed as arising from
potential defaults. Stated differently, risk in this case is
credit risk.
The experience of high and highly variable infla-
tion and interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s made such a
simple representation a wishful anachronism. Furthermore,
the rapid development of securitization and of new finan-
cial instruments in the 1980s, and the increasing activity
of banks in those areas, complicated matters still more. By
the mid-1980s, it was painfully obvious that total assets
could no longer be assumed to represent the risk exposures
of banking institutions.4
In part as a response to these issues, the 1988 Basle
Accord introduced an additional measure of exposure cor-
responding to off-balance-sheet instruments and activities.
The recognition that large off-balance-sheet exposures exist
is arguably the most significant contribution of the 1988
Accord. The framers of the Accord were faced with the
problem of handling increasingly complex instruments and
risks, and they responded with a methodology that is less
straightforward than that of earlier rules. For example, reg-
ulators were forced to deal with positions that have little or
no current value but have the potential to create significant
exposures for a bank in very short order.
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There was no unique way of solving this problem
and certainly no perfect one. The method selected was to
translate off-balance-sheet exposures such as swaps, for-
wards, credit guarantees, and lines of credit into credit-
equivalent amounts by taking some proportion—varying
according to the category of the instrument—of the nomi-
nal amount. The result was the inclusion of large, previ-
ously unrecognized first-order exposures in the measure of
exposure used for capital purposes.
Minimum capital requirements have been success-
ful to the extent that they have reflected these sorts of large
first-order exposure. The concept of exposure is distinct
from that of risk. Exposure is not defined as corresponding
to any particular type of risk, but rather as a measure of the
aggregate value that is subject to risks in general. For
instance, the face value of a debt instrument may provide a
good basic measure of exposure. Analysts may differ as to
the precise riskiness of the instrument—its sensitivity to
interest rate movements, the likelihood of counterparty
default, potential settlement problems, and the like. Nev-
ertheless, the range of values involved in those differences
is frequently of second order as compared with the basic
exposure of the instrument. Exposure is calculated by
means of well-defined rules that are straightforward
(though not necessarily simplistic), verifiable, and roughly
representative of the overall level of risk.
Another general feature of the 1988 Accord, the
exclusive focus on credit risk and the introduction of credit
risk weights, is conceptually and practically more problem-
atical. By identifying one specific risk—one particular
source of exposure—this approach led the way to a concep-
tual disaggregation of exposure into risk-by-risk compo-
nents. Because the Accord covered explicitly only credit
risk, regulators have expressed the need to modify it in
order to cover market risk. Moreover, there are other
important risks to consider, for instance, settlement risk,
operational risk, model risk, liquidity risk, and legal risk.
Although it may appear that such disaggregation is likely
to increase precision, identifying simple ways of measuring
each of the individual risks is generally quite difficult.
This conceptual experiment may result in several
complicated components, each representing an attempt at
measuring exposure to a particular risk with a certain
degree of precision. If taken to its logical conclusion, the
process may lead to a very complex measure indeed. More-
over, if compromises are made along the way, or possibly
even if they are not, the sum of the parts will not necessar-
ily be more precise than a comprehensive measure of expo-
sure along the lines of the Accord itself or of some of its
predecessors. U.S. regulators recognized the potential dan-
gers of disaggregation in 1989 by superimposing a simple
leverage ratio requirement (based on a ratio of capital to
assets) on the infrastructure of the Accord.5
A comprehensive measure of exposure may be suc-
cessful because any conceivable instrument is subject to
some type of risk. The classic commercial loan is subject to
credit risk, to be sure. A long-term Treasury bond may
have no credit risk, but it can have significant price risk,
much beyond that of a short-term loan. A mortgage secu-
rity may also have little credit risk: the investor has ulti-
mate recourse to collateral and in many cases to
government guarantees. Furthermore, because of the mort-
gage security’s amortization feature, its pure interest rate
risk is likely to be lower than that of a Treasury instrument
of similar maturity. Nevertheless, this type of security is
subject to prepayment or convexity risk, which can be
fairly intractable and unpredictable. Thus, as a first-order
approximation, a comprehensive exposure calculation may
be preferable to a much more detailed calculation based on
a breakdown of risk factors. The payoff from the latter
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approach is attainable only if regulators can and will pur-
sue it to its logical conclusion.
Historically, explicit capital requirements have
typically represented attempts to capture first-order expo-
sures, as defined above. More generally, what common
characteristics have capital requirements shared that have
made them useful to supervisors, regulators, investors,
depositors, and the public at large? As argued earlier, a list
of such characteristics may be construed to be at the same
time descriptive and prescriptive. Among those character-
istics, we find the following.
Minimum capital is objective and verifiable. The
basic information and formulas used to compute the
required amounts are generally well defined in advance.
The procedures are mechanical and, once in place, they are
applied without the intervention of ongoing value judg-
ments. One advantage accruing from this fact is that the
rules are easily verifiable by anyone with expertise and
access to the relevant information. An auditor should be
able to replicate the calculations, and any observer should
be able to reconstruct a portion of the computations if the
required data are available.
Almost corollary to the preceding is that mini-
mum capital is comparable across institutions and across time
and bears a stable relationship to the underlying positions. Capi-
tal rules generally yield the same result for the same portfo-
lio, independently of the random vagaries of the markets
and of any subjective decisions on the part of the firm or
the supervisor. Since minimum capital is also generally
public knowledge, the above comparisons may be performed
not only by the institution and its supervisors, but also by
investors, investment analysts, competitors, and any other
interested parties.
Minimum capital is generally based on somewhat
rough—though ideally comprehensive—calculations. Its func-
tion is to measure first-order exposures in an informative
but approximate way. The conflict between accuracy and
simplicity is more often than not resolved in favor of the
latter, though carefully constructed requirements can
achieve—in the aggregate—some accuracy as well. The
calculations required should be straightforward in order to
achieve the benefits discussed earlier. For instance, the
gamma of an options portfolio may be sufficiently straight-
forward for these purposes, even if there are those who
would not see sufficient simplicity in the calculation of a
weighted average of second derivatives of an assortment of
option pricing formulas.
The foregoing discussion raises the question
whether it is possible to achieve the goals set forth for min-
imum capital. How can all the recent inventive instru-
ments be handled, and how will future instruments—now
unknown—be incorporated in the framework? It is unreal-
istic to expect that a permanent solution to this problem
exists; periodic review of any rule is advisable. However,
the current rules, having served as one of the key models in
the discussion, are not far from the ideals outlined above.
For example, total assets have been seen as a useful basic
component of exposure in present and previous regulatory
regimes in the United States. The tougher question per-
tains to the treatment of off-balance-sheet positions, but a
good start has been made already in this respect within the
1988 Accord. The principal difficulty with the methods of
the Accord is their lack of flexibility in accommodating
new instruments. An adequate discussion of this point
would be too detailed and technical and would divert us
from the focus of this article. Nevertheless, a claim may be
stated—without proof—that regulators could use informa-
tion on contractual or expected cash flows associated with
new and existing instruments to define nominal amounts
for capital purposes.
Minimum capital is a guidepost. It represents a
minimum required level that is seldom directly binding. Ideally,
it is related to the positions that account for the bulk of a
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firm’s exposure to risk in an objective and predictable way
and is thus generally understandable. It was not and is not
intended as a level toward which the firm should aim nor
as a standard for internal risk management. Because it is
meant to be only a rough minimum standard, such inter-
pretations could be unsafe. Instead, the actual capital of
the firm should appreciably exceed the minimum. Beyond
that, it is difficult to give precise rules as to how large the
excess should be, although the next section provides some
general guidelines. It is clearly not in the interests of regu-
lators, depositors, and taxpayers to allow a bank’s net
worth to deteriorate to socially costly negative levels. A
minimum capital level provides an early warning of such
an event. For these reasons, minimum capital is not a
proxy for some other elusive concept, it is of interest in
and of itself.
OPTIMUM CAPITAL
In this article, we refer to the level of capital that a firm
determines is prudent, desirable, and achievable in the
short run as “optimum capital.” The firm’s own decision
as to what level of capital is desirable is predicated on its
views regarding the trade-off between the costs and bene-
fits of capital. Capital is costly, generally more so than
other claims. At a point in time, and given the particular
risks faced by the firm, management may specify a given
level of capital that meets its subjective goals for coverage.
This calculus is hardly exact, especially since some risks
are very difficult to model and quantify. Moreover, the
firm may in some cases exercise considerable discretion
regarding the nature and level of risks it faces. Neverthe-
less, using all the detailed information available, manage-
ment should be able to specify some ultimate capital goal,
as well as a plan to move swiftly toward that goal in the
near term.
The development and application of optimum
capital are fundamental components of a market-oriented
approach to capital. Even at present, a firm’s actual level of
capital is frequently disclosed and is regarded by the
investing public as a fairly direct result of the firm’s man-
agement policies. Thus, the motivation for the firm to
maintain adequate prudential capital derives not only from
its own internal judgment and that of its supervisors, but
also from the force of public scrutiny.
In this section, we focus on the firm’s determina-
tion of its optimum capital level. To be sure, the banking
industry is sufficiently remote from the theoretical model
of perfect competition to raise questions about the general
welfare implications of individually determined optima.
Some of those questions are considered in the next section.
Optimum capital is an idiosyncratic construct of
the firm and is quite distinct from minimum capital as
defined earlier. In fact, the relevant definition of capital,
that is, the range of instruments considered as capital, need
not be the same as for minimum capital. For example, a
viable ongoing firm would generally wish to rely on equity
capital to absorb losses rather than on potentially costly
defaults. The firm is also likely to view capital more
broadly as a source of financing for its activities, rather
than exclusively as protection for its depositors, leading to
a broader conception of capital.
The determination of optimum capital entails
continually facing tough questions and decisions about
goals, means, and consequences. Optimum capital itself is
a conceptual goal more than an objective reality. It is pur-
sued not because the firm will know and attain the thing in
itself, but because it imposes a discipline and a sense of
direction that are conducive to responsible management.
Although disaggregation may be counterproduc-
tive in calculating minimum capital, an approach based on
a detailed breakdown of risks and risk factors may be per-
fectly appropriate in the case of optimum capital. Clearly,
the firm itself has access to all the information it needs
regarding its own positions. In addition, the firm can go a
long way on the road to complexity if it so chooses, some-
thing many large institutions are already in the process of
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doing. It seems preferable not to impose on the firm a spe-
cific methodology for determining optimum capital, but
rather to allow it to be developed from within, according to
the firm’s own conception of its business goals and percep-
tion of its environment.6
As in the case of minimum capital, we may derive
empirically some generalizations about the determination
of optimum capital. That is, we may use the observed help-
ful characteristics of optimum capital to develop a set of
goals for its determination. Among those characteristics,
we find the following.
Optimum capital is subjective, hence difficult to repli-
cate and validate. Many tough decisions must be faced in
coming up with an optimum capital amount. Such deter-
minations may seem objective because of the quite sub-
stantial mathematical and statistical apparatus that
frequently underlies them. However, mathematics is only
an aid in portions of the process and contributes to the
modeling of some of the relationships, not necessarily to
the accuracy of the resulting numerical levels, which
remain subjective. The decision maker cannot escape
responsibility for the ultimate judgments about the goals
of the exercise and the level of coverage desired. The firm
must also attain a deep understanding of the construction
of optimum capital and of the related risk management
system and must track the system’s output and perfor-
mance on a continuous basis. This role is intrinsic to the
firm, and it is neither practical nor appropriate for others
to assume it.
Optimum capital is internal to the firm. In deter-
mining optimum capital, firms draw on proprietary infor-
mation that they may not wish to disseminate for reasons
of business competitiveness. Furthermore, the methodol-
ogy itself may be proprietary. Given the present state of the
art in risk management, there are many different ways of
measuring risk, and the discovery of accurate, tractable
methods may be of much value to their developers. The
public may be aware of the estimated level of optimum
capital only to the extent that the firm is able to attain that
level on an ongoing basis, in which case it would be
reflected in the publicly reported actual capital level. In
general, however, the figure is most meaningful to the firm
itself and to its supervisor, who is likely to be familiar with
the full methodology leading to the ultimate results.
Optimum capital involves no expectation or presump-
tion of comparability across institutions or across time and is
unstable in relation to the underlying positions. The subjectiv-
ity of the measure clearly makes comparisons across insti-
tutions difficult or impossible. Moreover, many of the
methods applied to calculate, say, price risk are dependent
on fluid measures of market values or instrument volatili-
ties. Such measures change from minute to minute, cer-
tainly from day to day, with resulting changes in the
computed riskiness of a portfolio even if its composition
remains essentially intact. Ultimately, results can be inter-
preted only in the full context of the process from which
they are derived.
Because optimum capital is subjective and firm-
specific, it is difficult for an outsider, even for a primary
supervisor, to gauge the appropriateness of a particular
level. In this connection, the minimum capital level plays
a useful role because it furnishes the outside observer with
an objective frame of reference for examining the less
transparent optimum measure. It is clear, however, that
no simple rules of thumb are available for evaluating cap-
ital levels; if they were, the whole optimum process could
be avoided.
In practice, a supervisor’s level of comfort depends
on the minimum required level of capital, on the excess of
actual capital over that level, on the transparency of the
firm’s methods and reporting, on the firm’s attitude
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toward risk in general, and on any other indicators of
financial condition that can be factored in, even if impres-
sionistically. If a firm’s actual capital level is a large multi-
ple of the required minimum, the supervisor will generally
be more comfortable than if it just exceeds the minimum.
Even so, a large multiple might provide limited comfort
with a firm that has complex, opaque operations and a
marked tendency toward risk taking. Similarly, a small
excess cushion might be acceptable for a conservative firm
in a rebuilding period at the end of a general economic
contraction.
Finally, optimum capital represents an attempt at pre-
cision, and—as an optimum goal—is necessarily binding. The
level of precision may depend on the component of opti-
mum capital being estimated. The methods applied to
price risk, such as the mathematically intensive value-at-
risk measures, may be fundamentally different from those
applied to credit risk or liquidity risk. Legal risk is likely
to be difficult to quantify, but may be significant. However
determined, the final result is by definition binding. The
firm should approach it as quickly as possible given market
conditions. Nevertheless, each institution faces cost and
timing considerations, and at any time the institution is
more likely to be on a path leading to the optimum than at
that point itself.
OPTIMUM CAPITAL AND THE “SOCIAL 
OPTIMUM”
The banking industry, like others in the financial sector, is
subject to extensive regulation and supervision. In and of
itself, such close scrutiny would seem to be an incentive for
firms to determine and hold optimal levels of capital, as
defined in the preceding section. From a public policy per-
spective, however, it is not immediately clear that a socially
optimal capital structure would result. If firms do maintain
individually optimal capital levels, are those levels consis-
tent with socially optimal amounts? Moreover, are there
competing incentives that would discourage firms from
maintaining individually or socially optimal levels?
There is no simple answer to the first question.
Although it is conceivable in theory that an optimal alloca-
tion of capital across firms may exist, it would be presump-
tuous to assume that such an optimum is readily
quantifiable. Thus, it seems reasonable to adopt the market
solution to this issue, namely, to assume that in the absence
of perverse incentives, individually determined optima are
acceptable for public policy purposes. This brings us to the
second question: do such perverse incentives exist? Fre-
quently cited in this context are the elements of the “safety
net”: special arrangements provided by official authorities
because of the special nature of the banking business. The
benefits of the safety net, if not properly priced, have the
potential to generate undesirable behavior.
An example of the concerns associated with the
safety net is provided by deposit insurance, whose primary
purpose is the protection of small depositors. A typical
account of the misuse of deposit insurance proceeds as fol-
lows. Firms have access to government-provided deposit
insurance at a flat rate that is not reflective of each institu-
tion’s potential risks.7 The mispriced insurance then leads
to moral hazard: the institution can hold inordinately risky
assets without driving away the protected depositors.
Eventually, the risky assets collapse, the firm becomes
insolvent, the depositors are made whole by the insurance
fund, and the insurer and the taxpayers incur large losses.
This sort of scenario is often cited in connection with the
U.S. thrift predicament of the 1970s and 1980s.8
One might attribute this chain of events to too
much risk. Alternatively, however, one might conclude
that there was too little capital. Normally, a firm is con-
cerned with self-preservation. There are various incentives
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for management, shareholders, debtholders, and depositors
to favor the firm’s continued existence over the dissipation
of its net worth.9 In the absence of other complications, the
firm’s view of its optimum level of capital should be consis-
tent both with the actual riskiness of its activities and with
the objective of attaining a certain prudent likelihood of
the preservation of firm value.
Realistically, other complications do exist, such as
deposit insurance and real or perceived implicit guarantees
of the “too-big-to-fail” variety. If the firm takes the bene-
fits of these provisions into account in determining its
optimum capital, and if the corresponding price structure
for those benefits is deficient, the probability of failure
increases and the explicit or implicit insurer is left to bear
the risks.
One way to approach this problem is to insist that
the firm not reduce its estimate of optimum capital as a
result of unpriced or mispriced benefits from the safety net.
In the absence of such a requirement, and strictly from the
individual firm’s point of view, the existence of the safety
net may represent an opportunity for the firm to hold a
lower level of capital without jeopardizing its funding or
its expected internal profit. Ignoring such benefits in the
determination of the optimum is akin to establishing an
insurance premium or reserve within the firm in the form
of additional capital. This reserve would reduce the likeli-
hood of firm insolvency approximately to the level that
would obtain in the absence of the safety net and would
correspondingly limit the costs to the official authorities
and to the public interest. From a public policy perspec-
tive, this solution has the advantages of being preventive
rather than palliative and of freeing the authorities from
any precommitment as to the precise nature and extent of
any subsequent rescue efforts.
What incentives do firms have to establish opti-
mum capital goals in this manner, and how can such an
approach be enforced? A strong and informed supervisory
system can be the key in providing the requisite incentives
and deterrents. The benefits associated with the safety net,
as well as other benefits such as authorization to participate
in a variety of activities, can be made available as incentives
to well-capitalized institutions. Although the determina-
tion of optimum capital is usually complex and highly sub-
jective, a well-informed supervisor may determine whether
the approach to optimum capital is reasonable and whether
it avoids reductions corresponding to any unpriced benefits
of the safety net. Contact between the firm and its supervi-
sor at both the technical and management levels can help
eliminate any differences of opinion that may arise.
As to deterrents, U.S. bank supervisors already
have at their disposal a series of enforcement actions that
can be used selectively even in cases where problems are
not yet dangerously acute. In implementing either incen-
tives or deterrents, the official examinations staff will face
significant demands. However, such demands seem
unavoidable in arrangements where the supervisory author-
ity retains any substantive responsibility for the solvency of
particular institutions or of the system as a whole.
ACTUAL CAPITAL AND ITS LIFE CYCLE
The discussion has focused so far on the development of a
frame of reference for capital. We can think of minimum
capital and optimum capital as two guideposts for the
evaluation of the actual level of capital held by a firm. The
first is stable and objective and should always be exceeded;
the second is variable and subjective and the institution
should always strive to attain it. At least two questions
suggest themselves. First, is the framework internally con-
sistent? Second, how is actual capital to be gauged in refer-
ence to the framework at different points in time and for
different firms?
If the supervisor and the institutions coincide in
their basic understanding of the world, minimum and
optimum capital should be mutually consistent. The mini-
mum requirement would be calibrated as a lower bound for
normal optimum levels. If estimated optimum capital
turns out to be less than minimum capital, either the ini-
tial judgments that led to the formulation of the minimum
were too strict or the ongoing judgments involved in the
determination of the optimum are too lax. The frequency
of such occurrences would indicate which possibility is
more likely. Even if the framework is internally consistent,
there may be some pathological cases in which the firm’s
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value. A classic example is the insolvent firm. Because such
firms have nothing to lose, they may find it optimal to
assume inordinately large risks without commensurate cap-
ital levels. Nevertheless, a cursory look at banks’ recent
actual capital levels, if these are interpreted as indicative of
internally determined optima, suggests that firms are con-
tent to hold large multiples of the minimum levels under
appropriate circumstances.
Given the two guideposts of minimum and opti-
mum capital, where should an institution’s actual capital
level be? By definition, in all cases, it should be as close as
possible to the optimum level. But the optimum may be
highly variable over time, so that the desirable excess over
the minimum required level depends on various time- and
firm-specific factors such as the riskiness of the firm’s posi-
tions, the economic condition of the firm, the sector in
which it operates, and the state of the economy as a whole.
In good times, it will generally be optimal for the firm to
build up its capital, which is at those times easier to come
by. Retained earnings will be drawn from a more plentiful
earnings base, and new issuance of capital in the markets
will be relatively inexpensive.
In bad times, some capital will be absorbed by the
occurrence of normal losses, that is, losses resulting from
taking prudent risks. Capital ratios will be predictably
lower, though still above the minimum requirements. At
these times, when firms have lower retained earnings and
face more expensive new issuance markets, it would be
unwise either to place undue pressure on individual firms
to raise relatively expensive capital too quickly or to extract
onerous penalties that could impair the firm’s successful
recovery and ongoing viability. If the purpose of capital is
to absorb losses arising in the normal course of business, it
should not be viewed as an anomaly when it predictably
does just that. Of course, the supervisor must be ready to
act firmly if supernormal losses ensue, and comparing
actual capital with the minimum level can be helpful in
developing early signals of impending difficulties.
A promising method for dealing with capital vari-
ations and fluctuations is embodied to a significant degree
in the “prompt regulatory action” provisions of the 1991
banking act.10 The provisions establish a relationship
between a firm’s level of capital and the degree to which it
is subject to regulatory constraints, for example, on lines of
business. A well-capitalized institution is allowed to par-
ticipate in risky activities with a minimum of additional
regulatory intervention. Other institutions (or the same
one at a different point in time) that just meet the capital
requirements are subject to close scrutiny in applying for
new activities, and those applications could be summarily
denied. In the extreme, firms that fail to meet some mini-
mum level of capital may be forced to shut down. In the
design of such a system, care must be exercised so that the
restrictions for firms with declining capital are not equiva-
lent to the onerous penalties mentioned above, which could
deal a mortal blow to an otherwise viable firm. In addition,
it may be misleading to use capital as the single source of
information for the operation of the system. Capital should
be interpreted in light of various key factors, both cross-
sectional and cyclical, such as the condition of the firm and
the state of the economy.
SUPERVISORY USE OF MINIMUM AND 
OPTIMUM CAPITAL
Minimum capital and optimum capital have peculiar char-
acteristics that make each inherently useful but different
from the other in fundamental ways. To be sure, some of
the methods used in the development of the two constructs
overlap. For example, the computation of minimum capital
can include sophisticated calculations—frequently used for
optimum capital—if they are straightforward and well
defined. Nonetheless, an attempt to bring the two con-
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structs closely in line could backfire. It could undermine
the useful objectivity of minimum capital and deprive
firms of the flexibility they need to determine optimum
capital levels.
The separateness of minimum and optimum capi-
tal is necessary because, as noted in earlier sections of this
article, their objectives are very different and their useful
characteristics are mutually contradictory. In the economic
analysis of the choice between two goods, two conflicting
objectives are customarily fused by means of some unspeci-
fied or arbitrary relative weighting scheme. The result is
that the optimal choice is normally a single combination
containing some of each of the two goods. In the case of
capital, such an interior solution is suboptimal because the
firm and the supervisor need not limit themselves to a sin-
gle construct. They can have both minimum capital and
optimum capital rather than a hybrid construct that would
disregard valuable information. The separate objectives
need not be fused; they can both be satisfied.
Thus, the supervisor could monitor periodically—
as frequently as feasible—compliance with the minimum
requirements. In evaluating the excess of actual over mini-
mum capital, the supervisor could take into account that
different levels may be advisable for different firms and for
a given firm at various points in the economic cycle. The
supervisor may also wish to monitor firms more closely
when minimum levels are approached, so that it may act
swiftly and decisively should those levels be breached.
The supervisor may supplement the effectiveness
of direct capital requirements by ensuring that the firm
makes its best effort to determine an optimum level of cap-
ital and to approach that level as quickly as possible.
Although the supervisor can make constructive use of
information bearing on the optimum capital of the firm
(for example, in evaluating the excess of actual over mini-
mum capital), the development and determination of the
optimum are best left to the firm. A single regulator is at
an obvious comparative disadvantage in determining which
particular methodology and assumptions are best suited for
each of a multitude of idiosyncratic firms. Each firm is in
the best position to make its own detailed decisions and
should be responsible for doing so in a prudent manner.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article identifies two constructs—minimum and
optimum capital—that provide a framework for evaluat-
ing a financial firm’s actual level of capital. The basic con-
clusions are derived from a review of the successful
measures employed in the past and the present by both
regulators and institutions. Furthermore, the article argues
that the distinct uses and characteristics of minimum and
optimum capital make it inadvisable to combine them
into a single measure, for they are so naturally contradic-
tory that a hybrid would be much less informative than
the two individual measures. This point may be confirmed
by simply summarizing and reviewing the properties of
the two constructs.
We find that minimum capital is objective, veri-
fiable, public, and comparable across institutions and
across time. It bears a stable relationship to the underly-
ing positions, is generally based on somewhat rough—
though ideally comprehensive—calculations, and repre-
sents a minimum required level of capital that is seldom
directly binding. In contrast, optimum capital is subjec-
tive, hence difficult to replicate and validate, and internal
to the firm. It is neither expected nor presumed to be
comparable across institutions or across time, is unstable
in relation to the underlying positions, represents an
attempt at precision, and—as an optimum goal—is nec-
essarily binding.
These two constructs, supplemented with other
relevant information explaining differences in optimal cap-
An attempt to bring the two constructs closely in 
line could . . . undermine the useful objectivity 
of minimum capital and deprive firms of the 
flexibility they need to determine optimum 
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ital levels across institutions and time, will give supervisors
a workable framework for gauging the capital adequacy of
a firm or group of firms. The approach requires adopting a
specific direction in moving forward from the present reg-
ulatory regime, but it has the advantage of not requiring
any drastic initial regulatory changes. Many appealing fea-
tures of the current system could be retained. Over the
longer run, however, the new direction could result in a
substantially simpler, more responsive regulatory struc-
ture.12 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JULY 1995 NOTES
ENDNOTES
1. See, for example, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1993,
1995) and Council of European Communities (1993).
2. In the 1783 book Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Immanuel
Kant sketched out his solution to all the fundamental issues in that
branch of philosophy. As in Kant, the Greek term “prolegomenon”
denotes here a critical discussion that sets the stage for further work in a
given field. In contrast to Kant’s ambitious agenda, the present claims are
somewhat more modest.
3. An excellent recent review of the microeconomic literature on bank
capital, with numerous references, is found in Santomero (1991). 
4. See Bank for International Settlements (1986) and Edwards and
Mishkin (1995).
5. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1989).
6. For a helpful discussion of the current status of the risk management
systems of financial institutions, see Group of Thirty (1993).
7. As a result of the 1991 banking act, deposit insurance premiums are
currently based on various factors, including capital adequacy, related to
the risk of losses to the insurance fund. See Section 302 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (1992).
8. See, for example, White (1989).
9. See, for example, Santomero (1991).
10. See Section 131 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1992).
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